Cautious Monotonicity in Case-Based Reasoning with Abstract
  Argumentation by Paulino-Passos, Guilherme & Toni, Francesca
ar
X
iv
:2
00
7.
05
28
4v
2 
 [c
s.A
I] 
 13
 Ju
l 2
02
0
Cautious Monotonicity in Case-Based Reasoning with Abstract Argumentation
Guilherme Paulino-Passos1 , Francesca Toni1
1Imperial College London, Department of Computing
{g.passos18, f.toni}@imperial.ac.uk
Abstract
Recently, abstract argumentation-based models of case-based
reasoning (AA-CBR in short) have been proposed, origi-
nally inspired by the legal domain, but also applicable as clas-
sifiers in different scenarios, including image classification,
sentiment analysis of text, and in predicting the passage of
bills in the UK Parliament. However, the formal properties of
AA-CBR as a reasoning system remain largely unexplored.
In this paper, we focus on analysing the non-monotonicity
properties of a regular version of AA-CBR (that we call
AA-CBR). Specifically, we prove that AA-CBR is not
cautiously monotonic, a property frequently considered de-
sirable in the literature of non-monotonic reasoning. We then
define a variation of AA-CBR which is cautiously mono-
tonic, and provide an algorithm for obtaining it. Further, we
prove that such variation is equivalent to using AA-CBR
with a restricted casebase consisting of all “surprising” cases
in the original casebase.
1 Introduction
Case-based reasoning (CBR) relies upon known solu-
tions for problems (past cases) to infer solutions for
unseen problems (new cases), based upon retrieving
past cases which are “similar” to the new cases. It is
widely used in legal settings (e.g. see (Prakken et al. 2015;
Cˇyras, Satoh, and Toni 2016a)), for classification (e.g.
via the k-NN algorithm) and, more recently, within the
DEAr methodology (Cocarascu et al. 2020)) and for
explanation (e.g. see (Nugent and Cunningham 2005;
Kenny and Keane 2019; Cocarascu et al. 2020)).
In this paper we focus on a recent approach
to CBR based upon an argumentative reading of
(past and new) cases (Cˇyras, Satoh, and Toni 2016a;
Cˇyras, Satoh, and Toni 2016b;
Cocarascu, Cˇyras, and Toni 2018; Cˇyras et al. 2019;
Cocarascu et al. 2020), and using Abstract Argumenta-
tion (AA) (Dung 1995) as the underpinning machinery.
In this paper, we will refer to all proposed incarna-
tions of this approach in the literature generically as
AA-CBR (the acronym used in the original paper
(Cˇyras, Satoh, and Toni 2016a)): they all generate an
AA framework from a CBR problem, with attacks from
“more specific” past cases to “less specific” past cases
or to a “default argument” (embedding a sort of bias),
and attacks from new cases to ”irrelevant” past cases;
then, they all reduce CBR to membership of the “default
argument” in the grounded extension (Dung 1995), and
use fragments of the AA framework for explanation
(e.g. dispute trees as in (Cˇyras, Satoh, and Toni 2016b;
Cocarascu et al. 2020) or excess features in
(Cˇyras et al. 2019)). Different incarnations of AA-CBR
use different mechanisms for defining “specificity”, ”ir-
relevance” and ”default argument”: the original version in
(Cˇyras, Satoh, and Toni 2016a) defines all three notions
in terms of ⊇ (and is thus referred to in this paper as
AA-CBR⊇); thus, AA-CBR⊇ is applicable only to cases
characterised by sets of features; the version used for clas-
sification in (Cocarascu et al. 2020) defines “specificity” in
terms of a generic partial order , ”irrelevance” in terms of
a generic relation 6∼ and ”default argument” in terms of a
generic characterisation δC (and is thus referred to in this
paper as AA-CBR, 6∼,δC ). Thus, AA-CBR, 6∼,δC is in
principle applicable to cases characterised in any way, as sets
of features or unstructured (Cocarascu et al. 2020). Here we
will study a special, regular instance of AA-CBR, 6∼,δC
(which we refer to as AA-CBR) in which “irrelevance”
and the ”default argument” are both defined in terms of
“specificity” (and in particular the “default argument” is
defined in terms of the “most specific” case). AA-CBR
admits AA-CBR⊇ as an instance, obtained by choosing
=⊇ and by restricting attention to “coherent” casebases
(whereby there is no ”noise”, in that no two cases with
different outcomes are characterised by the same set of
features).
AA-CBR was originally inspired by the legal domain
in (Cˇyras, Satoh, and Toni 2016a), but some incarnations of
AA-CBR, integrating dynamic features, have proven use-
ful in predicting and explaining the passage of bills in the
UK Parliament (Cˇyras et al. 2019), and some instances of
AA-CBR, 6∼,δC have also shown to be fruitfully applica-
ble as classifiers in a number of scenarios, including classi-
fication with categorical data, with images and for sentiment
analysis of text (Cocarascu et al. 2020).
In this paper we study non-monotonicity properties of
AA-CBR understood at the same time as a reason-
ing system and as a classifier. These properties, typi-
cally considered for logical systems, intuitively charac-
terise in which sense systems may stop inferring some
conclusions when more information is made available
to them (Makinson 1994). These properties are thus re-
lated to modelling inference which is tentative and de-
feasible, as opposed to the indefeasible form of inference
of classical logic. Non-monotonicity properties have al-
ready been studied in argumentation systems, such as ABA
and ABA+ (Cˇyras and Toni 2015; Cˇyras and Toni 2016),
ASPIC+ (Dung 2014; Dung 2016) and logic-based argu-
mentation systems (Hunter 2010). In this paper, we study
those properties for the application of argumentation to clas-
sification, in particular in the form of AA-CBR.
The following example illustrates AA-CBR (and
AA-CBR⊇ in particular) as well as its non-monotonicity,
in a legal setting.
({hm, sd}, ?)({hm},+)
(∅,−)
Figure 1: Initial AA framework for Example 1. Past cases (with
their outcomes) and the new case (with no outcome, indicated by
a question mark) are represented as arguments. AA-CBR predicts
outcome + for the new case. (Grounded extension in colour.)
({hm, sd}, ?)({hm, sd},−)
({hm},+)
(∅,−)
Figure 2: Revised AA framework for Example 1. Here, the added
past case changes the AA-CBR-predicted outcome to − by lim-
iting the applicability of the previous past case. (Again, grounded
extension in colour.)
Example 1. Consider a simplified legal system built by
cases and adhering, like most modern legal systems, to the
principle by which, unless proven otherwise, no person is to
be considered guilty of a crime. This can be represented by a
“default argument” (∅,−), indicating that, in the absence of
any information about any person, the legal system should
infer a negative outcome − (that the person is not guilty).
(∅,−) can be understood as an argument, in the AA sense,
given that it is merely what is called a relative presump-
tion, since it is open to proof to the contrary, e.g. by proving
that the person did indeed commit a crime. Let us consider
here one possible crime: homicide1 (hm). In one case, it was
1This is merely a hypothetical example, so the terms used do
established that the defendant committed homicide, and he
was considered guilty, represented as ({hm},+). Consider
now a new case ({hm, sd}, ?), with an unknown outcome,
of a defendant who committed homicide, but for which it
was proven that it was in self-defence (sd). In order to pre-
dict the new case’s outcome by CBR, AA-CBR reduces the
prediction problem to that of membership of the default ar-
gument in the grounded extensionG (Dung 1995) of the AA
framework in Figure 1: given that (∅,−) 6∈ G, the predicted
outcome is positive (i.e. guilty), disregarding sd and, indeed,
no matter what other feature this case may have. Thus, up to
this point, having the feature hm is a sufficient condition
for predicting guilty. If, however, the courts decides that for
this new case the defendant should be acquitted, the case
({hm, sd},−) enters in our casebase. Now, having the fea-
ture hm is no longer a sufficient condition for predicting
guilty, and any case with both hm and sd will be predicted
a negative outcome (i.e. that the person is innocent). This is
the case for predicting the outcome of a new case with again
both hm and sd, in AA-CBR using the AA framework in
Figure 2. Thus, adding a new case to the casebase removed
some conclusions which were inferred from the previous,
smaller casebase. This illustrates non-monotonicity.
In this paper we prove that the kind of inference underpin-
ning AA-CBR lacks a standard non-monotonicity prop-
erty, namely cautious monotonicity. Intuitively this property
means that if a conclusion is added to the set of premises
(here, the casebase), then no conclusion is lost, that is, every-
thing which was inferable still is so. In terms of a supervised
classifier, satisfying cautious monotonicity culminates in be-
ing “closed” under self-supervision. That is, augmenting the
dataset with conclusions inferred by the classifier itself does
not change the classifier.
Then, we make a two-fold contribution: we define (for-
mally and algorithmically) a provably cautiously monotonic
variant of AA-CBR, that we call cAA-CBR, and prove
that it is equivalent to AA-CBR applied to a restricted
casebase consisting of all “surprising” cases in the original
casebase. We also show that the property of cautious mono-
tonicity of cAA-CBR leads to the desirable properties of
cumulativity and rational monotonicity. All results here pre-
sented are restricted to coherent casebases, in which no case
characterisation (problem) occurs with more than one out-
come (solution).
2 Background
2.1 Abstract argumentation
An abstract argumentation framework (AF) (Dung 1995) is
a pair (Args, ), whereArgs is a set (of arguments) and 
is a binary relation onArgs. Forα, β ∈ Args , if α β, then
we say that α attacks β and that α is an attacker of β. For
a set of arguments E ⊆ Args and an argument α ∈ Args,
E defends α if for all β  α there exists γ ∈ E such that
γ  β. Then, the grounded extension of (Args, ) can be
constructed as G =
⋃
i>0 Gi, where G0 is the set of all
not correspond to a specific jurisdiction.
unattacked arguments, and ∀i > 0, Gi+1 is the set of ar-
guments that Gi defends. For any (Args , ), the grounded
extensionG always exists and is unique and, if (Args, ) is
well-founded (Dung 1995), extensions under other seman-
tics (e.g. stable extensions (Dung 1995), where E ⊆ Args
is stable if ∄α, β ∈ E such that α  β and, moreover,
∀α ∈ Args \ E, ∃β ∈ E such that β  α) are equal to G.
In particular for finite AFs, (Args, ) is well-founded iff it
is acyclic.
Given (Args , ), we will sometimes use α ∈ (Args, )
to stand for α ∈ Args.
2.2 Non-monotonicity properties
We will be interested in the following properties.2 An arbi-
trary inference relation ⊢ (for a language including, in par-
ticular, sentences a, b, etc., with negations ¬a and ¬b, etc.,
and sets of sentences A,B) is said to satisfy:
1. non-monotonicity, iff A ⊢ a andA ⊆ B do not imply that
B ⊢ a;
2. cautious monotonicity, iff A ⊢ a and A ⊢ b imply that
A ∪ {a} ⊢ b;
3. cut, iff A ⊢ a and A ∪ {a} ⊢ b imply that A ⊢ b;
4. cumulativity, iff ⊢ is both cautiously monotonic and satis-
fies cut;
5. rational monotonicity, iff A ⊢ a and A 6⊢ ¬b imply that
A ∪ {b} ⊢ a;
6. completeness, iff either A ⊢ a or A ⊢ ¬a.
3 Setting the ground
In this section we define AA-CBR, adapting definitions
from (Cocarascu et al. 2020).
All incarnations of AA-CBR, including AA-CBR,
map a database D of examples labelled with an outcome
and an unlabelled example (for which the outcome is un-
known) into an AF. Here, the database may be understood
as a casebase, the labelled examples as past cases and the
unlabelled example as a new case: we will use these ter-
minologies interchangeably throughout. In this paper, as
in (Cocarascu et al. 2020), examples/cases have a charac-
terisation (e.g., as in (Cˇyras, Satoh, and Toni 2016a), char-
acterisations may be sets of features), and outcomes are
chosen from two available ones, one of which is selected
up-front as the default outcome. Finally, in the spirit of
(Cocarascu et al. 2020), we assume that the set of charac-
terisations of (past and new) cases is equipped with a partial
order  (whereby α ≺ β holds if α  β and α 6= β and
is read “α is less specific than β”) and with a relation 6∼
(whereby α 6∼ β is read as “β is irrelevant to α”). Formally:
Definition 2 (Adapted from (Cocarascu et al. 2020)). LetX
be a set of characterisations, equipped with a partial order
≺ and a binary relation 6∼. Let Y = {δo, δ¯o} be the set of
(all possible) outcomes, with δo the default outcome. Then,
a casebase D is a finite set such that D ⊆ X × Y (thus
a past case α ∈ D is of the form (αC , αo) for αC ∈ X
2We are mostly following the treatment of Makinson (1994).
and αo ∈ Y ) and a new case is of the form (NC , ?) for
NC ∈ X . We also discriminate a particular element δC ∈ X
and define the default argument (δC , δo) ∈ X × Y .
A casebase D is coherent if there are no two cases
(αC , αo), (βC , βo) ∈ D such that αC = βC but αo 6= βo .
For simplicity of notation, we sometimes extend the def-
inition of  to X × Y , by setting (αc, αo)  (βc, βo) iff
αc  βc.
3
Definition 3 (Adapted from (Cocarascu et al. 2020)). The
AF mined from a dataset D and a new case (NC , ?) is
(Args, ), in which:
• Args = D ∪ {(δC , δo)} ∪ {(NC , ?)} ;
• for (αC , αo), (βC , βo) ∈ D ∪ {(δC , δo)}, it holds that
(αC , αo) (βC , βo) iff
1. αo 6= βo,
2. αC  βC , and
3. ∄(γC , γo) ∈ D ∪ {(δC , δo)} with αC ≻ γC ≻ βC and
γo = αo;
• for (βC , βo) ∈ D ∪ {(δC , δo)}, it holds that (NC , ?)  
(βC , βo) iff (NC , ?) 6∼ (βC , βo).
The AF mined from a dataset D alone is (Args ′, ′), with
Args ′ = Args \ {(NC , ?)} and 
′= ∩(Args ′ ×Args ′).
Note that if D is coherent, then the “equals” case in the
item 2 of the definition of attack will never apply. As a re-
sult, the AF mined from a coherent D (and any (NC , ?)) is
guaranteed to be well-founded.
Definition 4 (Adapted from (Cocarascu et al. 2020)). LetG
be the grounded extension of the AF mined from D and
(NC , ?), with default argument (δC , δo). The outcome for
NC is δo if (δC , δo) is in G, and δ¯o otherwise.
In this paper we focus on a particular case of this scenario:
Definition 5. The AF mined from D alone and the AF
mined fromD and (NC , ?), with default argument (δC , δo),
are regular when the following requirements are satisfied:
1. the irrelevance relation 6∼ is defined as: x1 6∼ x2 iff x1 6
x2, and
2. δC is the least element ofX .
4
This restriction connects the treatment of a characterisa-
tion αC as a new case and as a past case. We will see below
that these conditions are necessary in order to satisfy desir-
able properties, such as Theorem 7.
In the remainder, we will restrict attention to regu-
lar mined AFs. We will refer to the (regular) AF mined
from D and (NC , ?), with default argument (δC , δo), as
3In (Cocarascu et al. 2020)  was directly given over X × Y .
Note that, inX×Y , anti-symmetry may fail for two cases with dif-
ferent outcomes but the same characterisation, ifD is not coherent,
and thus  is merely a preorder onX×Y . When we are restricted
to a coherent D, we can guarantee it is a partial order.
4Indeed this is not a strong condition, since it can be proved
that if αC 6 δC then all cases (αC , αo) in the casebase could be
removed, as they would never change an outcome. On the other
hand, assuming also the first condition in Definition 5, if (αC , ?) is
the new case and αC 6 δC , then the outcome is δ¯o necessarily.
AF(D,NC), and to the (regular) AF mined from D alone
as AF(D). Also, for short, given AF(D,NC), with de-
fault argument (δC , δo), we will refer to the outcome forNC
as AA-CBR(D,NC).
5 In the remainder of the paper we
assume as given arbitrary X , Y , D, (NC , ?), (δC , δo) (sat-
isfying the previously defined constraints), unless otherwise
stated.
In the remainder of this section we will identify some
properties of AA-CBR, concerning its behaviour as a
form of CBR.
Agreement with nearest cases. Our first property regards
the predictions of AA-CBR in relation to the “most sim-
ilar” (or nearest) cases to the new case, when these near-
est cases all agree on an outcome. This property generalises
(Cˇyras, Satoh, and Toni 2016a, Proposition 2) in two ways:
by considering the entire set of nearest cases, instead of re-
quiring a unique nearest case, for AA-CBR, instead of its
instanceAA-CBR⊇. As in (Cˇyras, Satoh, and Toni 2016a),
we prove this property for coherent casebases. We first de-
fine the notion of nearest case.
Definition 6. A case (αC , αo) ∈ D is nearest to NC iff
αC  NC and it is maximally so, that is, there is no
(βC , βo) ∈ D such that αC ≺ βC  NC .
Theorem 7. If D is coherent and every nearest case to NC
is of the form (αC , o) for some outcome o ∈ Y (that is, all
nearest cases to the new case agree on the same outcome),
then AA-CBR(D,NC) = o (that is, the outcome for NC
is o).
Proof. Let G be the grounded extension of AF(D,NC).
An outline of the proof is as follows:
1. We will first prove that each argument in G is either
(NC , ?) or of the form (βC , o) (that is, agreeing in out-
come with all nearest cases).
2. Then we will prove that if o = δ¯o (that is, o is the
non-default outcome), then (δC , δo) 6∈ G (and thus
AA-CBR(D,NC) = δ¯o, as envisaged by the theorem).
3. Finally, by using the fact that AF(D,NC) is well-
founded (given that D is coherent), and thus G is also
stable, we will prove that if o = δo (that is, o is
the default outcome), then (δC , δo) ∈ G (and thus
AA-CBR(D,NC) = δo, as envisaged by the theorem).
We will now prove 1-3.
1. By definition G =
⋃
i>0 Gi. We prove by induction that,
for every i, each argument inGi is either (NC , ?) or of the
form (βC , o). Then, given that each element ofG belongs
to some Gi, the property holds forG.
(a) For the base case, considerG0. (NC , ?) and all nearest
cases are unattacked, and thus in G0 (notice how this
requires the AF to be regular, otherwise nearest cases
could be irrelevant). G0 may however contain further
unattacked cases. Let β = (βC , βo) be such a case. If
5Note that we omit to indicate in the notations the default argu-
ment (δC , δo), and leave it implicit instead for readability.
NC 6 βC , then (δC , δo) 6∼ β and thus (NC , ?) attacks
β, contradicting that β in unattacked. So βC  NC .
As β is not a nearest case, there is a nearest case
α = (αC , αo) such that βC ≺ αC . By contradiction,
assume βo 6= o. Let Γ = {γ ∈ Args | γ = (γC , γo),
βC ≺ γC  αC and γo = o}. Notice that Γ is non-
empty, as α ∈ Γ. Γ is the set of “potential attackers”
of β, but only -minimal arguments in Γ do actually
attack β. Let η be such a -minimal element of Γ.6 By
construction, η attacks β. Thus β is attacked and not in
G0, a contradiction. Hence, βo = o, as required.
(b) For the inductive step, let us assume that the property
holds for a genericGi, and let us prove it forGi+1. Let
β = (βC , βo) ∈ Gi+1 \ Gi (if β ∈ Gi, the property
holds by the induction hypothesis). (NC , ?) does not
attack β, as otherwise β would not be defended by Gi,
as Gi is conflict-free. Thus, once again, as β is not a
nearest case, there is a nearest case α = (αC , αo) such
that βC ≺ αC . Again, assume that βo 6= o. Then let
Γ = {γ ∈ Args | γ = (γC , γo), βC ≺ γC  αC
and γo = o}, with η a -minimal element of Γ. Then
η attacks β. However, as Gi defends β, there is then
θ ∈ Gi such that θ attacks η. By inductive hypothesis,
θ is either (NC , ?) or θ = (θC , o). The first option is
not possible, as η ∈ Γ, and thus ηC  αC , and of
course αC  NC . Thus, ηC  NC and is thus not
attacked by (NC , ?). This means that (θC , o) attacks
η = (ηC , ηo). But this is absurd as well, as η ∈ Γ
and thus ηo = o = θo. Therefore, our assumption that
βo 6= o was false, that is, βo = o, as required.
2. If o = δ¯o, the default argument (δC , δo) is not in G, since
we have just proven that all arguments in G other than
(NC , ?) have outcome o.
3. If o = δo, then let β be an attacker of (δC , δo), and thus of
the form β = (βC , δ¯o) (again see how regularity is nec-
essary, since otherwise (NC , ?) could be the attacker). β
is not in G and, since G is also a stable extension, some
argument in G attacks β. This is true for any attacker β
of the default argument, and thus the default argument is
defended by G. As G contains every argument it defends,
the default argument is in the grounded extension, con-
firming that the outcome for NC is δo.
Addition of new cases. The next result characterises the
set of past cases/arguments attacked when the dataset is ex-
tended with a new labelled case/argument. In particular, this
result compares the effect of predicting the outcome of some
N2 fromD alone and fromD extended with (N1, o1), when
there is no case in D with characterisation N1 already and
moreoverD is coherent.
This result will be used later in the paper and is interesting
in its own right as it shows that, any argument attacked by the
“newly added” case (N1, o1) is easily identified in the sets
6Note that η is guaranteed to exist, as Γ is non-empty and other-
wise we would be able to build an arbitrarily long chain of (distinct)
arguments, decreasing w.r.t. ≺. However this would allow a chain
with more elements than the cardinality of Γ, which is absurd.
G0 and G1 in the grounded extension G, being sufficient to
check those rather than the entire casebase D.
Lemma 8. Let D be coherent, N1, N2 ∈ X , o1 ∈
Y , and suppose that there is no case in D with char-
acterisation N1. Consider AF1 = AF(D,N1) and
AF2 = AF(D ∪ {(N1, o1)}, N2). Finally, letG(AF1)and
G(AF2) be the respective grounded extensions. Let β ∈ D
be such that (N1, o1) β in AF2. Then,
1. for every γ that attacks β in AF1, N1 6∼ γ (that is, γ is
irrelevant to N1 and, by regularity, N1 6 γ);
2. in AF1, (N1, ?) defends β;
3. β ∈ G(AF1) and, for G(AF1) =
⋃
i>0 Gi, β is either in
G0 (that it, it is unattacked), or in G1.
4. For every θ = (θC , θo) ∈ D such that (N1, ?) defends θ
in AF1, if θo 6= o1, then, in AF2, (N1, o1) θ.
Proof. 1. Let β = (βC , βo). From the definition of attack:
(i) N1 ≻ βC , (ii) o1 6= βo, and (iii) there is no (αC , xo)
such that xo = o1 and N1 ≻ αC ≻ βC . Consider η =
(ηC , ηo) such that η attacks β in AF1 (if there is no such
η then the result trivially holds).
Assume by contradiction that η is relevant to N1. Then
by regularity N1  ηC . But since D is coherent and
(N1, o1) 6∈ D, η and N1 are distinct, and thus N1 ≻ ηC .
As η attacks β, ηo 6= βo, but this in turn implies that
ηo = o1, since (N1, o1) also attacks β, in AF2. But then
N1 ≻ ηC ≻ βC , with ηo = o1. This contradicts require-
ment 3 in the second bullet of Definition 3 of the attack
between (N1, o1) and β. Therefore, η is not relevant to
N1, as we wanted to prove.
2. Trivially true, by 1 (as, if η is an attacker β, thenN1 6∼ η;
but then (N1, ?) η).
3. Trivially true, by 2.
4. Since (N1, ?) defends θ in AF1, then any attacker η of
θ is irrelevant to N1, and by regularity, N1 6 η. Thus
requirement 3 in the second bullet of Definition 3 is sat-
isfied. Requirement 1 is the hypothesis and requirement 2
is satisfied since (N1, ?) defends θ in AF1.
Coinciding predictions. The last result (also used later in
the paper) identifies a “core” in the casebase for the purposes
of outcome prediction: this amounts to all past cases that are
less (or equally) specific than the new case for which the
prediction is sought. In other words, irrelevant cases in the
casebase do not affect the prediction in regular AFs.
Lemma 9. LetD1 andD2 be two datasets. LetNC ∈ X be
a characterisation, and DiNC = {α ∈ Di | α  NC} for
i = 1, 2. If D1NC = D2NC , then AA-CBR(D1, NC) =
AA-CBR(D2, NC) (that is, AA-CBR predicts the
same outcome for NC given the two datasets).
Proof. For i = 1, 2, let AFi = AF(Di, NC) and the
grounded extensions be Gi =
⋃
j>0 G
i
j . We will prove that
∀j : G1j ⊆ G
2
j+1 and G
2
j ⊆ G
1
j+1, and this allows us to
prove thatG1 = G2, which in turn implies the outcomes are
the same. Here we consider only G1j ⊆ G
2
j+1, as the other
case is entirely symmetric. By induction on j:
• For the base case j = 0:
IfG10 ⊆ G
2
0, we are done, since we always have thatG
i
j ⊆
Gij+1. If not, there is a α ∈ G
1
0 \G
2
0. Since α ∈ G
1
0, it is
relevant to NC , and thus α  NC , which in turn implies
that α ∈ D2, since D1NC = D2NC .
On the other hand, as α 6∈ G20, there is a case β ∈ AF2
such that β  α. However, α 6∈ AF1, otherwise α would
be attacked in AF1 and thus not in G
1
0. But then, since
D1NC = D2NC , this means that β 6 NC . Finally, this
means that (NC , ?)  β, and thus G
2
0 defends it. There-
fore, β ∈ G21, what we wanted to prove.
• For the induction step, from j to j + 1:
Again, if G1j+1 ⊆ G
2
j+1, we are done. If not, there is a
α ∈ G1j+1 \ G
2
j+1. Again we can check that this implies
that α ∈ D2. Now, since α ∈ G
1
j+1, then G
1
j defends it.
But now, by inductive hypothesis,G1j ⊆ G
2
j+1. Therefore,
G2j+1 also defends α, which implies that α ∈ G
2
j+2,as we
wanted.7 This concludes the induction.
To conclude, we can now see that G1 = G2, since, once
more without loss of generality, if we consider α ∈ G1, by
definition of G1 there is a j such that α ∈ G1j . But since
G1j ⊆ G
2
j+1, α ∈ G2. This proves that G1 ⊆ G2. The
converse can be proven analogously.
4 Non-monotonicity analysis of classifiers
In this section we provide a generic analysis of the non-
monotonicity properties of data-driven classifiers, using D,
X and Y to denote generic inputs and outputs of classifiers,
admitting our casebases, characterisations and outcomes as
special instances. Later in the paper, we will apply this anal-
ysis to AA-CBR and our modification thereof. Typically,
a classifier can be understood as a function from an input
setX to an output set Y . In machine learning, classifiers are
obtained by training with an initial, finite D ⊆ (X × Y ),
called the training set. In (any form of) AA-CBR, D can
also be seen as a training set of sorts. Thus, we will char-
acterise a classifier as a two-argument function C that maps
from a dataset D⊆ (X × Y ) and from a new input x ∈ X
to a prediction y ∈ Y .8 Notice that this function is total, in
line with the common assumptions that classifiers generalise
beyond their training dataset.
Let us model directly the relationship between the dataset
D and the predictions it makes via the classifier as an infer-
ence system in the following way:
Definition 10. Given a classifier C: 2(X×Y ) ×X → Y , let
L = L+∪L− be a language consisting of atoms L+ = X×
7In abstract argumentation it can be verified that, if E ⊆ Args
defends an argument γ, and E ⊆ E′, then E′ also defends γ.
8Notice that this understanding relies upon the assumption that
classifiers are deterministic. Of course this is not the case for many
machine learning models, e.g. artificial neural networks trained
using stochastic gradient descent and randomised hyperparameter
search. This understanding is however in line with recent work us-
ing decision functions as approximations of classifiers whose out-
put needs explaining (e.g. see (Shih, Choi, and Darwiche 2019)).
Moreover, it works well when analysing AA-CBR.
Y and negative sentences L− = {¬(x, y)|(x, y) ∈ X × Y }.
Then, ⊢C is an inference relation from 2
L+ to L such that
• D ⊢C (x, y), iff C(D, x) = y;
• D ⊢C ¬(x, y), iff there is a y
′ such thatC(D, x) = y′ and
y′ 6= y.9
Intuitively, C defines a simple language L consisting of
atoms (representing labelled examples) and their negations,
and ⊢C applies a sort of closed world assumption aroundC.
Then, we can study non-monotonicity properties from
Section 2.2 of ⊢C.
Theorem 11. 1. ⊢C is complete, i.e. for every (x, y) ∈ (X×
Y ), either D ⊢C (x, y) or D ⊢C ¬(x, y).
2. ⊢C is consistent, i.e. for every (x, y) ∈ (X × Y ), it does
not hold that bothD ⊢C (x, y) andD ⊢C ¬(x, y).
3. ⊢C is cautiously monotonic iff it satisfies cut.
4. ⊢C is cautiously monotonic iff it is cumulative.
5. ⊢C is cautiously monotonic iff it satisfies rational mono-
tonicity.
Proof. 1. By definition of ⊢C, directly from the totality of
C.
2. By definition of ⊢C, since C is a function.
3. Let ⊢C be cautiously monotonic,D ⊢C p andD∪{p} ⊢C
q, for p, q ∈ L. By completeness, eitherD ⊢C q or D ⊢C
¬q (here ¬q = r if q = ¬r, and ¬r if q = r). In the first
case we are done. Suppose the second case holds. Since
D ⊢C p, by cautious monotonicity D ∪ {p} ⊢C ¬q. But
then D ⊢C q and D ⊢C ¬q, which is absurd since ⊢C is
consistent. Therefore D 6⊢C ¬q, and then D ⊢C q. The
converse can be proven analogously.
4. Trivial from 3.
5. Since ⊢C is complete, D 6⊢C ¬p implies D⊢Cp, and thus
rational monotonicity reduces to cautious monotonicity.
5 Cautious monotonicity inAA-CBR
Our first main result is about (lack of) cautious mono-
tonicity of the inference relation drawn from the classifier
AA-CBR(D,NC).
Theorem 12. ⊢AA-CBR is not cautiously monotonic.
Proof. We will show a counterexample, instantiating in the
following way: X = 2{a,b,c,z}, Y = {−,+}, and =⊇.
Define D= {({a},+), ({c},+), ({a, b},+), ({c, z},+)}
and (δC , δo)= (∅,−) from which AF(D) in Figure
3 is obtained, and two new cases: N1 = {a, b, c} and
N2 = {a, b, c, z}.
Let us now consider AA-CBR(D,N1) and
AA-CBR(D,N2). We can see in Figure 4 that
D ⊢AA-CBR (N1,+) and in Figure 5 that
D ⊢AA-CBR (N2,−).
9We could equivalently have defined D ⊢C ¬(x, y) iff
C(D,x) 6= y. We have not done so as the used definition can
be generalized for a scenario in which C is not necessarily a to-
tal function. This scenario is left for future work.
({c},+)
({c, z},−)({a, b},−)
({a},+)
(∅,−)
Figure 3:AF(D), given (δC , δo) = (∅,−), for the proof of The-
orem 12.
Now, finally, let us consider AF(D ∪ {(N1,+)}, N2))
in Figure 6. We can then conclude that D ∪
{(N1,+)} ⊢AA-CBR (N2,+) even though
D ⊢AA-CBR (N1,+) and D ⊢AA-CBR (N2,−),
as required.
({a, b},−)
({a},+)
(∅,−)
({a, b, c}, ?)
({c},+)
({c, z},−)
Figure 4: AF(D,N1) for the proof of Theorem 12, with the
grounded extension coloured.
Note that the proof of Theorem 12 shows that the infer-
ence relation drawn from the original form of AA-CBR
(that is AA-CBR⊇) is also non-cautiously monotonic,
given that the counterexample in the proof is also obtained
by using AA-CBR⊇. This counterexample amounts to an
expansion of Example 1, as follows.
Example 13. (Example 1 continued) Consider now that a
different type of crime happened: public offending some-
one’s honour, which we will call defamation (df ). In one
case, it was established that the defendant did publicly dam-
age someone’s honour, and was considered guilty ({df},+).
In a subsequent case, even if proven that the defendant did
hurt someone’s honour, it was established that this was done
by a true allegation (the truth defence), and thus the case was
dismissed, represented as ({df, td},−).
What happens, then, if a same defendant is:
({a, b},−)
({a},+)
(∅,−)
({a, b, c, z}, ?)
({c},+)
({c, z},−)
Figure 5: AF(D,N2) for the proof of Theorem 12, with the
grounded extension coloured.
({a, b},−)
({a},+)
(∅,−)
({a, b, c},+) ({a, b, c, z}, ?)
({c},+)
({c, z},−)
Figure 6: AF(D ∪ {(N1,+)}, N2) for the proof of Theorem 12,
with the grounded extension coloured.
1. simultaneously proven guilty of homicide, of defamation,
but shown to have committed the homicide in self-defence
(({hm, df, sd}, ?))?
2. simultaneously proven guilty of homicide, of defamation,
shown to have committed the homicide in self-defence,
also shown to have committed defamation by a true alle-
gation (({hm, df, sd, td}, ?))?
We can map this to our counterexample in Theorem 12
by setting a = hm, b = sd, c = df , and z = td. The first
question is answered by the AF represented in Figure 4, with
outcome+, that is, the defendant is considered guilty.
What we show in the proof of Theorem 12, given this in-
terpretation of the counter-example, is that the answer to the
second question in AA-CBR would depend on whether
the case in the first question was already judged or not. If
not, then the cases ({hm, sd},−) and ({df, td},−) would
be the nearest cases, and the outcomewould be−, that is, not
guilty. However, if the case in the first question was already
judged and incorporated into the case law, it would serve as a
counterargument for ({hm, sd},−), and guarantee that the
outcome is +, that is, guilty. Intuitively this seems strange,
and we focus on one reason for that: the case in the first
question was judged as expected by the case law, and it may
seem strange that the order in which it happens may affects
the case in the second question.
The example above aims only to illustrate an interpre-
tation in which the way AA-CBR operates does not
seem appropriate. Whether this behaviour of AA-CBR⊇
in particular is desirable or not depends on other elements
such as the interrelation between features (in general, for
AA-CBR, between the characterisations and the partial
order).
6 A cumulativeAA-CBR
We will now present cAA-CBR, a novel, cumulative in-
carnation of AA-CBR which satisfies cautious monotonic-
ity.
Preliminaries. Firstly, let us present some general no-
tions, defined in terms of the ⊢C inference relation from an
arbitrary classifier C.
Intuitively, we are after a relation ⊢′
C
such that if D ⊢C c
and D ⊢C d, then D ∪ {c} ⊢
′
C
d (in our concrete setting,
⊢C=⊢AA-CBR and ⊢
′
C
=⊢cAA-CBR). We also want the
property that, whenever D is “well-behaved” (in a sense to
be made precise later), D ⊢C s iff D ⊢
′
C
s. In this way,
given that D ⊢′
C
c and D ⊢′
C
d, then we would conclude
D ∪ {c} ⊢′
C
d, making ⊢′
C
a cautious monotonic relation.
We will define ⊢′
C
by building a subset of the original
dataset in such a way that cautious monotonicity is pre-
served. We start with the following notion of (un)surprising
examples:
Definition 14. An example (x, y) ∈ X × Y is unsurpris-
ing (or not surprising) w.r.t. D iff D \ {(x, y)} ⊢C (x, y).
Otherwise, (x, y) is called surprising.
We then define the notion of concise (subset of) the
dataset, amounting to surprising cases only w.r.t. the dataset:
Definition 15. Let S ⊆ X×Y be a dataset, S′ ⊆ S, and let
ϕ(S′) = {(x, y) ∈ S | (x, y) is surprising w.r.t. S′}. Then
S′ is concise w.r.t. S whenever it is a fixed point of ϕ, that
is, ϕ(S′) = S′.
To illustrate this notion in the context of AA-CBR,
consider the dataset S from which the AF in Fig-
ure 6 is drawn. S is not concise w.r.t. itself, since
({a, b, c},+) is unsurprising w.r.t. S (indeed, S \
{({a, b, c},+)} ⊢AA-CBR ({a, b, c},+), see Figure 4).
Also, S′ = S \ {({a, b},−), ({a, b, c},+)} is not con-
cise either (w.r.t. S), as ({a, b},−) is surprising w.r.t. S′
(the predicted outcome being +), but not an element of
S′. The only concise subset of S in this example is thus
S′′ = S \ {({a, b, c},+)}.
Let us now considerD′ ⊆ D, forD the dataset underpin-
ning our ⊢C. IfD
′ is concise w.r.t.D, (x, y) ∈ (X×Y ) \D
is an example not in D already and D′ ⊢C (x, y), then
(x, y) is unsurprising w.r.t. D′, and thus D′ is still concise
w.r.t. D ∪ {(x, y)}. Now, suppose that there is exactly one
such concise D′ ⊆ D w.r.t. D (let us refer to this subset
simply as concise(D)). Then, it seems attractive to define
⊢′
C
, as: D ⊢′
C
(x, y) iff concise(D) ⊢C (x, y). Such ⊢
′
C
inference relation would then be cautiously monotonic if
concise(D) = concise(D ∪ {(x, y)}). This identity is in-
deed guaranteed given that a concise subset of D is still a
concise subset of D ∪ {(x, y)}, and given our assumption
that there is a unique concise subset ofD}. In the remainder
of this section we will prove uniqueness and (constructively)
existence of concise(D) in the case of AA-CBR.
Uniqueness of concise subsets inAA-CBR.
Theorem 16. Given a coherent dataset D, if there exists a
conciseD′ ⊆ D w.r.t.D thenD′ is unique.
Proof. By contradiction, let D′′ be a concise subsets of D
distinct from D′. Let then (x, y) ∈ (D′ \D′′) ∪ (D′′ \D′)
such that (x, y) is -minimal in this set. Then the sets
{(x′, y′) ∈ D′ | (x′, y′) ≺ (x, y)} and {(x′, y′) ∈ D′′ |
(x′, y′) ≺ (x, y)} are equal, otherwise (x, y) would not
be minimal. But then, since D is coherent, by Lemma 9
we can conclude that D′ \ {(x, y)} ⊢AA-CBR (x, y) iff
D′′ \ {(x, y)} ⊢AA-CBR (x, y). Thus, (x, y) is surprising
w.r.t. bothD′ and D′′ or w.r.t. neither. But since it is an ele-
ment of one but not the other, one of them is either missing
a surprising element or containing a non-surprising element.
Such a set is not concise, contradicting our initial assump-
tion.
Existence of concise subsets in AA-CBR. We have
proven that concise(D) is unique, if it exists. Here we prove
that existence is guaranteed too. We do so constructively,
and by doing do we also prove that our approach is practi-
cal, giving as we so a (reasonable) algorithm that finds the
concise subset ofD.
The main idea behind the algorithm is simple: we start
with the default argument, and progressively build the ar-
gumentation framework by adding cases fromD by follow-
ing the partial order . Before adding a past case, we test
whether it is surprising or not w.r.t. the dataset underpin-
ning the current AF: if it is, then it is added; otherwise, it
is not added. More specifically, the algorithm works with
strata over D, alongside . In the simplest setting where
each stratum is a singleton, the algorithm words as fol-
lows:starting with D0 = {(δC , δo)} and the entire dataset
D = {di}i∈{1,...,|D|} unprocessed, at each step i + 1, we
obtain either Di+1 = Di ∪ {di+1}, if di+1 is surprising
w.r.t.Di, andDi+1 = Di, otherwise. Then Dˆ = D|D| ⊆ D
is the result of the algorithm. In the general case, each exam-
ple of the current stratum is tested for “surprise”, and only
the surprising examples are added to Di. The procedure is
formally stated in Algorithm 2, using in turn Algorithm 1.
We illustrate the application of the algorithms next.
Example 17. Once more consider the dataset
D= {({a},+), ({c},+), ({a, b},+), ({c, z},+), ({a, b, c},+)}
in Figure 6, as well as the definitions used in that example
for X , Y , (δC , δo) and . Let us examine the application
of Algorithm 2 to it. We start with an AF consisting
only of (δC , δo), that is, D0 = ∅, AF0 = AF(D0) =
AF(∅) = ({(∅,−)},∅). The first stratum would consist
of stratum1 = {({a},+), ({c},+)}. Of course, then, we
have AA-CBR({(∅,−)}, ({a}, ?)) = −, and similarly
for ({c}, ?). Thus, every argument in stratum1 is sur-
prising, and are thus included in the next AF , resulting in
D1 = ({a},+), ({c},+) and AF1 = AF(D1).
Now, the second stratum is stratum2 =
{({a, b},−), ({c, z},−)}. We can verify
that AA-CBR(D1, ({a, b}, ?)) = + and
AA-CBR(D1, ({c, z}, ?)) = +. Thus ({a, b},−)
and ({c, z},−) are both surprising, and then included in
next step, that is,D2 = D1 ∪{({a, b},−), ({c, z},−)}, and
AF2 = AF(D2).
Finally, stratum3 = {({a, b, c},+)}. Now we ver-
ify that AA-CBRD2, ({a, b, c},+) = +, which means
that ({a, b, c},+) is unsurprising. Therefore it is not added
in the argumentation framework, that is, D3 = D2 and
thus AF3 = AF(D3) = AF(D2) = AF2. Now
unprocessed = ∅, and the selected subset if D3, with cor-
responding aaFoneD3 = AF3, and we are done. We can
check that using cAA-CBR the counterexample in the
proof of Theorem 12 would fail, since ({a, b, c},+) would
not have been added to the AF.
Notice that we could have defined the algorithm equiva-
lently by looking at cases one-by-one rather than grouping
them in strata. However, using strata has the advantage of
allowing for parallel testing of new cases.
Theorem 18 (Convergence). Algorithm 2 converges.
Proof. Obvious, since at each iteration of the while loop,
the variable stratum is assigned to a non-empty set, due
to the fact that unprocessed is always a finite set, and thus
there is always at least one minimal element. Thus, the cardi-
nality of unprocessed is reduced by at least 1 at each loop
iteration, which guarantees that it will eventually become
empty.
Theorem 19 (Correctness of Algorithm 1). Every execution
of simple add((Args, ), next case) (Algorithm 1) in Al-
gorithm 2 correctly returns AF(Args ∪ {next case}).
Proof (sketch). This is essentially a consequence of Lemma
8. We know that there will never be an argument in Args
with the same characterisation as next case, since they will
occur in the same stratum, thus the lemma applies. The
lemma guarantees that Algorithm 1 adds all attacks that need
to be added and only those. Finally, we need to check that
it will never be necessary to remove an attack. This is true
due to the requirement 3 in the second bullet of Definition 3,
and since arguments are added following the partial order.
Therefore the only modifications on the set of attacks are
the ones in simple add.
Theorem 20 (Correctness of Algorithm 2). If the input
dataset is coherent, then the dataset underpinning the AF
resulting from Algorithm 2 is concise.
Proof (sketch). In order to prove that, for the re-
turned Argscurrent, Argscurrent\{(δC , δo)} is concise,
we just need to prove that at the end of each loop
Algorithm 1: simple add algorithm for AA-CBR.
Input: An AA-CBR framework (Args , ) and a case n = (nc, no)
Output: A new AA-CBR (Args
′, ′) framework
DEF ←− {(x, y) ∈ AF(Args, nC) | (x, y) 6= (nC , ?) and (nC , ?) defends (x, y) in AF(Args, nc)} ;
Args ′ ←− Args ∪ {n} ;
 ′←− ( ∪{(n, a) | a = (ac, ao), a ∈ DEF, and ao 6= no}) ;
return (Args ′, ′)
Algorithm 2: Setup/learning algorithm for cAA-CBR.
Input: A datasetD
Output: An AF cAA-CBR(D)
unprocessed←−D ;
Argscurrent ←− {(δC , δo)} ;
 current←− ∅ ;
while unprocessed 6= ∅ do
stratum←− {(x, y) ∈ unprocessed | (x, y) is  -minimal in unprocessed} ;
unprocessed←− unprocessed \ stratum ;
to add←− ∅ ;
for next case ∈ stratum do
(case characterisation, case outcome)←− next case ;
if the outcome for case characterisation w.r.t. (Argscurrent, current) is not case outcome then
to add←− to add ∪ {next case} ;
end
end
for next case ∈ to add do
(Argscurrent, current)←− simple add((Argscurrent, current), next case) ;
end
end
return (Argscurrent, current)
Argscurrent\{(δC , δo)} is concise w.r.t. the set of all seen
examples.
As the base case, before the loop is entered, this is clearly
the case, as the only seen argument is the default.
As the induction step, we know that every case previously
added is still surprising, since the new cases added are not
smaller than them according to the partial order, and thus by
Lemma 9 their prediction is not changed, that is, they keep
being surprising. The same is true for every case previously
not added: adding more cases afterwards does not change
their prediction. For the cases added at this new iteration, by
definition the surprising ones are added and the unsurprising
ones are not. Regarding the order in which cases of the same
stratum are added, each of the surprising cases will be in-
cluded and the unsurprising ones will not be. It can be seen
that the order is irrelevant as, since they are all -minimal
and the dataset is coherent, they are incomparable, so each
case in the list is irrelevant with respect to the other. Thus,
for every case seen until this point, it is in the AF iff it is
surprising. As this is true for every iteration, it is true for the
final, returned AF.
A full complexity analysis of the algorithm is outside the
scope of this paper. However, notice here that the algorithm
refrains from building the AF from scratch each time a new
case is considered, as seen in Theorem 19. Still regardingAl-
gorithm 1, notice that it is easy to compute the set DEF while
checking whether the next case is surprising or not, thus we
could optimise its implementation with the use of caching.
Besides, the subset of minimal cases (that is, the stratum)
can be extracted efficiently by representing the partial order
as a directed acyclic graph and traversing this graph. Finally,
as mentioned before, the order in which the cases in the same
stratum are added does not affect the outcome. Thus, each
case in the same stratum can be safely tested for surprise in
parallel.
cAA-CBR. All theorems in this section so far lead to
the following corollary:
Corollary 21. Given a coherent dataset D, the dataset un-
derpinning the AF resulting from Algorithm 2 is the unique
conciseD′ ⊆ D, w.r.t.D.
To conclude, we can then define inference in
cAA-CBR, the classifier yielded by the strategy de-
scribed until now:
Definition 22. Let D be a coherent dataset and let
concise(D) be the unique concise subset of D, w.r.t. D.
Let cAF(D,NC) be the AF mined from concise(D)
and (NC , ?), with default argument (δC , δo). Then,
cAA-CBR(D,NC) stand for the outcome for NC , given
cAF(D,NC).
Thus, we directly obtain the inference relation
⊢AA-CBR .
Then, cAA-CBR amounts to the form ofAA-CBR us-
ing this inference relation. It is easy to see, in line with the
discussion before Theorem 16, and using the results in Sec-
tion 11, that cAA-CBR satisfies several non-monotonicity
properties, as follows:
Theorem 23. ⊢cAA-CBR is cautiously monotonic and also
satisfies cut, cumulativity, and rational monotonicity.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we study regular AA-CBR frame-
works, and propose a new form of AA-CBR, denoted
cAA-CBR, which is cautiously monotonic, as well as,
as a by-product, cumulative and rationally monotonic.
Given that AA-CBR admits the original AA-CBR⊇
(Cˇyras, Satoh, and Toni 2016a) as an instance, we have (im-
plicitly) also defined a cautiously monotonic version thereof.
(Some incarnations of) AA-CBR have been shown
successful empirically in a number of settings (see
(Cocarascu et al. 2020). The formal properties we have con-
sidered in this paper do not necessarily imply better em-
pirical results at the tasks in which AA-CBR has been
applied. We thus leave for future work an empirical com-
parison between AA-CBR and cAA-CBR. Other is-
sues open for future work are comparisons w.r.t. learnabil-
ity (such as model performance in the presence of noise), as
well as a full complexity analysis of the new model. Also,
we conjecture that the reduced size of the AF our method
generates could possibly have advantages in terms of time
and space complexity: we leave investigation of this issue to
future work.
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